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Abstract
The internal rate of return to public investment in agricultural R&D is estimated for each of the continental US
states. Theoretically, our contribution provides a way of
obtaining the returns to a local public good using Rothbart’s concept of virtual prices. Empirically, a stochastic
cost function that includes own knowledge capital stock
as well as spillover capital stock variables is estimated.
Stochastic spatial dependency among states generated
by knowledge spillovers is used to define the “appropriate” jurisdictions. We estimate an average own-state rate
of 17% and a social rate of 29% that compare well to the
9 and 12% average returns of the S&P500 and NASDAQ
composite indexes during the same period.

significant regional knowledge spillovers has led authors to conclude that public agricultural R&D should
be coordinated at regional or national levels. However,
little evidence is available on the returns to agricultural
R&D by state and, therefore, little guidance exists on
where to invest taxpayers’ dollars to maximize agricultural productivity.
The present study intends to contribute to the debate by providing an assessment of the benefits from
public investment in agricultural R&D for each continental US state, acknowledging in theory and empirics their local public goods nature. This is the first
study to endogenously recover the impact of public investments in agricultural R&D for each of the 48 continental US states while accounting for structural and
stochastic dependency among the states due to knowledge spillovers.2 The assessment is conducted in terms
of the Internal Rate of Return3 (IRR): the greater is the
IRR for one state, ceteris paribus, the more socially desirable it is to invest in public agricultural R&D in that
state. Any responsible policy discussion about the disposition of public funds should be based on knowledge of the returns to such investment. We provide the
estimates of the IRR to public investments in agricultural R&D for each US state hoping in this way to contribute to the policy debate.

Keywords: Internal rates of return, Public R&D, Spillins,
Spillovers, Local public goods, Appropriate jurisdiction,
Spatial
1. Introduction
Several studies report significant returns to public investments in agricultural research and development (R&D) in the United States by regions, commodities or at the national level.1 The existence of

1. For a review of the economic impacts of agricultural R&D at sectoral and aggregate levels both for the US and other countries,
see Evenson (2001), Alston et al. (2000), Alston (2002), Huffman and Evenson (2006).
2. Khanna et al. (1994) analyzed the optimal allocation of public monies to agricultural R&D in the same 48 US states considered
in the present study with a joint production model of public and state-specific benefits. Spillovers were defined as contemporary expenditures on R&D in neighboring states, and state expenditures on R&D were endogenous to their formulation.
3. The IRR is the rate of return that equals the discounted stream of benefits from an investment with its initial cost.
95

96

Plastina & Fulginiti in Journal of Productivity Analysis 37 (2012)

In addition, we contribute to the literature by providing a general theory and a way of measuring the
returns to a local public good using the concept of
virtual prices.4 In assessing the benefits of public agricultural R&D, it is crucial to recognize its local public
goods nature. Since there is no market for trading public goods, no market assessment of the value of public
goods is readily available, and their value must be recovered endogenously. In addition, a local public good
needs a definition of its ‘appropriate’ jurisdiction. While
some research results are fully usable only by the jurisdiction that the research was intended for some are also
usable by other jurisdictions, giving rise to knowledge
spillovers.5 Therefore, the major challenges for the researcher are: to estimate the returns to this public good
and to do so by attributing the benefits from an investment in R&D to the ‘appropriate’ jurisdiction. Latimer
and Paarlberg (1965) and Evenson (1967) have early indicated the potential distortion in the estimates of the
contribution of public R&D to the agricultural sector
due to the presence of spillovers.6 It is in this sense that
the researcher must define the jurisdiction under analysis. In this study, the benefits from an investment in
R&D are estimated from the impacts of such investment
on the production structure for two different levels of
aggregation: the state where the investment was undertaken (the own state benefits), and the state and other
states in its ‘jurisdiction’ (the social benefits).7
The researcher then must address the problems in estimation of the benefits of R&D, not only for the own
state, but for all other states affected by the existence of
spillover effects across them. Most of the studies on the
effects of R&D are ad-hoc. They include primal and dual
approaches in which a variable representing the stock
of own state R&D is included in a production function,
cost function or on a two step regression of a productivity index to capture the own state benefits. Some studies add an ad-hoc spill-in variable to capture the social
benefits and to avoid the structural dependence problem among states due to the local public goods nature
of the investment. But it is possible that knowledge generated in one state might benefit other states beyond
the geographical limits imposed ad-hoc by researchers
when defining the spill-in stocks. If this is the case, the
residuals of the estimating model will contain relevant

information and will be correlated among geographical
units, generating cross-sectional stochastic dependence.
A distinctive feature of this article is that the aggregate technology is represented by a stochastic variable
cost function with knowledge capital stock (research)
variables and a stochastic spatial error structure. The
own-state stock of public R&D enters this function as a
fixed input of production. A spill-in variable is also explicitly incorporated into the model to account for structural dependency among “similar” states due to knowledge spill-ins. Following Fulginiti and Perrin (1993)
and Onofri and Fulginiti (2008) and using the derivative property of the cost function we recover the virtual
prices for own-state public R&D and spill-in knowledge
stocks. Parameters of such a model are then used in the
calculation of IRRs. These IRRs then will include own
state plus spill-in impacts of the R&D investment. In addition to incorporating knowledge stock spill-ins in the
structure of the cost function, we allow in estimation for
the existence of stochastic spatial dependency in the error term to adjust the estimates by the extent of propagation across states not captured structurally. A model
with spatial autocorrelation (SAR) in the error structure
is estimated with US state-level annual data for the period 1949–1991 (Craig et al. 2002) using generalized spatial three stage least squares (Keleijian and Prucha 2004).
The resulting estimates from the spatial model are compared to the estimates from a non-spatial model to assess the impact of stochastic spatial dependency on
estimated IRRs. We expect that failing to correct for stochastic spatial dependency induced by knowledge spillovers would affect the definition of the appropriate jurisdiction and the magnitude of returns to R&D.
The estimates of the IRR to public agricultural R&D
are positive and significant for all states. The average
own state IRR for the nation is estimated, in the spatial model, at 17%, while the average social IRR is estimated at 29%. In the non-spatial model these estimates
are 12 and 14% higher, respectively. The returns estimated are fairly high, even though correcting for stochastic spill-ins in public agricultural research has resulted in lower IRRs.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section
the economic model used to capture the virtual prices of
a local public good is presented. It is shown then how

4. A virtual price, introduced originally in demand theory by Rothbart (1941), is the price at which the consumer/producer, acting
as a price taker, will choose to consume a specified bundle.
5. As mentioned by a reviewer, there are many examples of knowledge spillovers, like formula-based public research committed
to, for example, Michigan’s experiment station to study poultry diseases intended to benefit local poultry producers that benefit
producers in Delaware, North Carolina, and other poultry producing states as well.
6. White and Havlicek (1979) showed that failure to take into account geographical spillovers from US regional agricultural research inflated the estimated rate of return to R&D in the Southern region by more than 25%.
7. Huffman et al. (2002) estimated the own state IRR to public expenditures on agricultural R&D for the “representative” Midwestern state to be 11% per annum, and a social rate of return of 43% per annum. Yee et al. (2002) estimated the social rate of return to public agricultural research to be about 3.5–6.7 times the own state rate of return for the “representative” state in each of
the seven regions defined in their study. Huffman and Evenson (2006) estimated regional social IRRs to range from 49 to 62%.
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these virtual prices are incorporated into the calculation
of the own state and the social IRRs and how the “appropriate jurisdictions” are determined. The data used
and the estimation procedure are described next, followed by a description of the results. A summary of the
findings and their relevance is provided in the concluding section.
2. The model
The unit of analysis, determined by the level of aggregation of the available data, is the state. We assume that
each state produces an aggregate output, y, using variable inputs x = x1,…,xN, fixed private inputs v = v1,…
,vM, and fixed public inputs V = V1,…,VQ. The vector of
prices of the variable inputs is denoted by w = w1,…,wN,
N
with w · x = ∑ wnxn. Let y = f(x, v, V) be the producn=1
tion function satisfying monotonicity and weak essentiality in x. Let B(y, v, V) = {x: f(x, v, V) ≥ y} be the closed,
non-empty and convex restricted input requirement set
to produce output y. Then, a well-defined non-negative short-run variable cost function c(w, y, v, V) exists
which is non-decreasing, concave, continuous and positively linearly homogeneous in w, and non-decreasing
in y (Chambers 1988):
(1)
Furthermore, if c(w, y, v, V) is differentiable in w, it also
satisfies Shephard’s lemma in w:
(2)
where x is the vector of cost-minimizing variable input
demands, homogeneous of degree zero in w and with
symmetric and negative semi-definite matrix wx = ∇ww
c(w, y, v, V). If c(w, y, v, V) is differentiable in v and V,
Shephard’s lemma can be applied to fixed factors. For
convenience, c(w, y, v, V) is assumed twice continuously
differentiable in all its arguments. The monetary value
placed by producers on marginal units of private fixed
factors v, hereon referred to as the shadow value or virtual price Zv , is represented by the amount of variable
cost saved in the production of y due to the availability
of an extra unit of v:
(3)
In the short-run, Zv can be positive or negative, depending on the level of the private fixed factor with respect
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to its long-run optimum and on its disposability assumption. If the level of the private fixed factor is below
its long-run optimum, the variable cost function is expected to be decreasing in v (i.e., Zv > 0) since the set of
feasible combinations of (x, v, V) increases when an extra unit of v is available for production, so that new costminimizing opportunities (previously unavailable) are
opened up (Chambers 1988, p. 102).8 If the private fixed
factor is above its long-run optimum and it is freely disposable (i.e., it does not cost anything in terms of output
or other inputs to get rid of the extra units above the optimal level), then the variable cost function is expected
to be independent of v (i.e., Zv = 0). However, if the
private fixed factor is above its long-run optimum but
it is not freely disposable (i.e., it is costly to dispose off
the extra units), its shadow value is expected to take a
negative sign (i.e., Zv < 0), indicating that an extra unit
of the private fixed factor might actually increase shortrun variable costs. Since we make no a priori assumption
about the free disposability of private fixed inputs or
their level with respect to their long-run optimum, we
do not expect any particular sign for Zv .
The monetary value placed by producers on marginal units of public factors V, hereon referred to as the
shadow value or virtual price ZV , is represented by the
amount of variable cost saved in the production of y due
to the availability of an extra unit of V:
(4)
Similar to the shadow values of private fixed factors, the
shadow values of public factors can be positive or negative, depending on their free disposability. While some
public inputs might be freely disposable, (e.g. public
roads that producers might choose not to use), some
others are not (e.g. pollution). Since we make no a priori
assumption about the free disposability of public inputs,
we do not expect any particular sign for ZV . If ZV ≥ 0, an
extra unit of the public factor generates short-run savings to agricultural producers; while if ZV < 0 it might
actually increase short-run variable costs.9
Local public goods are provided to satisfy the needs
of a certain group of economic agents in a specific jurisdiction. In particular, local public knowledge on agricultural sciences generated for a specific state i, Gi , is developed to satisfy the needs of producers in that state.
Therefore, it is completely usable by local producers
and is incorporated as a public fixed input of production in the present model. However, that same knowl-

8. In primal space, Zv ≥ 0 implies that the marginal product of an extra unit of the private fixed factor v is positive when the marginal cost of producing an extra unit of output is positive; i.e., Zv = –∂ */∂v = (∂ */∂y) (∂y/∂v) ≥ 0 ⇔ (∂y/∂v) ≥ 0, where  * is the
Lagrange function corresponding to Equation (1) evaluated at the optimal x values, (∂ */∂y) is the reciprocal marginal cost of an
extra unit of output, and (∂y/∂v) is the marginal product of the private fixed factor v.
9. Since the second order gradients of the variable cost with respect to private and public fixed inputs — ∇vvc(·),∇vVc(·), and
∇VVc(·) — characterize the rate of change of their shadow values, and no assumption was made on the sign of their shadow values, no assumption is made on the rates of change.
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edge might also be used by producers in other states after some adjustments to (different) local conditions. The
stock of knowledge spill-outs from state i to state j (i ≠ i),
Sji , is the share of the stock of knowledge generated in
state i, Gi , usable by producers in state j:
(5)
where αji represents the degree of usability of knowledge from state i in state j, and 0 ≤ αji < 1. Therefore, the
aggregate stock of spill-ins from neighboring states (indexed by j) to state i is defined as:
(6)
and the vector of the stocks of public fixed inputs available to producers in state i is:

can be re-expressed as:

(11)
and a necessary condition for r to exist is that the
shadow value of Gi be positive for at least one period,
i.e., ZGi,t0+q > 0 for some q > 0. However, as long as the
knowledge generated by one state i is free and usable by
producers in other j states, the concept of total benefits
from an increase in public investments in R&D in state
i at time t0 might be expanded to also include the spillovers of that investment, i.e. the reductions in the cost
of agricultural production in the other j states. The social
internal rate of return is the rate r1 that solves the following program:

(7)
The shadow value of the own state stock of public R&D
in state i, ZGi , can now be expressed as:
(8)

(12)

and the shadow value of the stock of public R&D from a
neighboring state j, ZSij , as:

Note that −∆cj,t ∆Sj,t /∆Sj,t ∆Gi,t corresponds to the concept of the shadow value to state j of an increase in the
stock of knowledge in state i, ZSji as defined in Equation
(9). Equation (12) can be re-expressed in terms of virtual
prices as:

(9)
where the second equality holds by construction of
the stock of knowledge spill-outs from state j to state i
(Equation 5). These two concepts, obtained from the theoretical model, are used below in the calculation of the
own state and the social IRRs of public investments.
The internal rate of return to public outlays in agricultural R&D is the discount rate that makes the discounted stream of benefits during m periods stemming from an increase in public investments in R&D in
a given state i at time t0, equal to its initial cost. The initial cost is the extra investment at time t0, conventionally represented in discrete terms in the corporate finance literature as a negative amount, ∆Ri,t0< 0. In the
present analysis, the stream of benefits for the state that
conducted the R&D activities, state i, are the reductions
in the cost of agricultural production in successive periods (−∆ci,t) derived from the increased stock of publicly
available knowledge (∆Gi,t) generated by the investment
in R&D in t0. Therefore, the own state internal rate of return is the rate r that solves the following program:
(10)
Note that −∆ci,t/∆Gi,t corresponds to the concept of
ZGi , as defined in Equation (8). Therefore, Equation (10)

(13)
The variable Gi is constructed as a weighted sum of previous expenditures on public agricultural R&D in state i
(Ri ), with the weights following an inverted V-pattern.10

(14)
Given that the αij ’s are not observable, the variable
Si is constructed as the direct sum of the stocks of Gj ’s
conducted in other states (j ≠ i):11

(15)
and the imperfect usability nature of knowledge generated in other states is incorporated structurally into the
analysis through interaction terms (rather than S being
treated as another fixed input like G or T) in the variable

10. A complete description on construction of Gi is given in the following section.
11. A complete description of Si is given in the following section.
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cost chosen. The following translog cost function is hypothesized to be stable over the period 1949–1991:

(18)

(19)

(16)

(20)

where i indexes states (i = 1, 2, …, 48). In this study,
labor (L), purchased inputs (M), and capital (K) are
treated as variable inputs, while land (T) is considered a private fixed input. Note that the stock of spillins is treated differently than the own-state stock
of R&D: while G is fully usable by the state and is
treated similarly to the private fixed factor T, S is only
partially usable and enters the variable cost through
interaction terms.
In addition, since agricultural production is sensitive to the geoclimatic characteristics (soil type, humidity, etc.) of the area in which it is conducted, farms
in different locations might use different technologies
of production, this being another source of structural
spatial heterogeneity across states (Anselin 1998). This
translog function incorporates fixed state effects, represented by the dummy variables DUMj that capture,
structurally, the unobservable characteristics of each
state that influence local agricultural production. Note
that these parameters are interacted with input prices
in their levels to allow for fixed effects in the derived
input demands. In addition to the inclusion of terms in
the specification of the cost function to capture structural differences and interactions across states, this
study allows stochastic spatial interaction with the
purpose of using information that might not be captured structurally.
For each state i, the three private input share equations (n = M, K, L), the virtual share of the private fixed
input T, and the virtual shares of the public fixed inputs
G and S implied by (16) are derived using Shephard’s
lemma, respectively, as (i subscripts omitted for simplicity of exposition):

Equations (18), (19), and (20) are, respectively, the elasticity of cost with respect to land, the elasticity of cost
with respect to the own state stock of public agricultural
R&D, and the elasticity of cost with respect to the stock
of spill-ins from public agricultural R&D conducted in
neighboring states. These elasticities can be either positive or negative, depending on the free disposability
of the fixed inputs and their levels with respect to their
long-run optimum.
In order to estimate the own state IRR to public expenditures on agricultural R&D, (11) can be conveniently
expressed as the discounted sum of the shadow values
of Gi over time weighted by the research expenditure
weights used to construct the stocks of public agricultural R&D from Equation (14)

(17)

(21)
where Bi,t = ϖt ZGi,t is a direct measure of the own state
monetary benefits at t from an extra dollar invested in
public agricultural R&D at t0. We use Equation (19) with
ϖt0 = 0 to evaluate Equation (21) and obtain the own
state IRR to investment in public agricultural R&D in
each of the 48 states.
Similarly, using Equations (13), (14), and (15), the social IRR r1 can be expressed as:

(22)
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where Fi,t is the social shadow value of Gi at time t; and
B*i,t = ϖt Fi,t measures social monetary benefits at time t
from an extra dollar invested in public agricultural
R&D in state i at t0. We use Equations (19) and (20) to
estimate r1.
If ZSi ≥ 0 then r1 ≥ r, indicating that the total benefits
of R&D are at least as big as the benefits that accrue only
to the state where the expenses were incurred.
3. Data
The agricultural production variables for all 48 states for
the period 1949–1991 are from Craig et al. (2002).12 According to Acquaye et al. (2003) this data set “was developed with a view in particular to measuring the effects of public agricultural R&D on productivity” and
it included Fisher Ideal quantity indexes for the flows
of agricultural output, labor, purchased inputs, capital
and land, expenditures on land, labor, purchased inputs
and capital, and the value of total agricultural output for
each state (see “Appendix 1”). The variable cost in this
study is the sum of expenditures on labor, purchased inputs and capital for farm production in constant 1949
dollars.13 In order to reflect the differences in the relative sizes of the agricultural sector across states, we mul-

tiplied quantity indexes for land and output by their respective expenditures in 1949.14
The own-state R&D stock G was constructed as a
31-years weighted average of gross public expenditures
on agricultural R&D at state level in constant US dollars,
according to (14).15 As in McCunn and Huffman (2000),
the reason for using political rather than geoclimatic
borders is our focus on public funding, which is based
on political borders. The weights ϖ t are constructed by
transforming Chavas and Cox’s (1992) estimated marginal effects of public research expenditures on US agricultural productivity, CCt, to add up to one:
(23)
The weights follow an inverted-V distribution of the
lags of the effects of R&D on productivity through time
implying a gestation period of 7 years, followed by an
8 years period of increasing effects at a low rate, and another 8 years period of increasing effects at a higher rate,
reaching a maximum in year twenty-three, and declining
to zero from there onwards by year thirty-one.16 These estimates are appealing because they were obtained using
non-parametric methods, avoiding strong distributional
assumptions required in parametric estimation.17 Gross

12. This data set is available at http://www.apec.umn.edu/faculty/ppardey/data.html , and was used in Acquaye et al. (2003). This
data set has been revised and extended over 1949–2002 (Pardey et al. 2007), but was not publicly available. Comparing the descriptive statistics of the newer series from Table 1 in Andersen et al. (2007) to the older series, capital seems to have been revised downwards (the mean, the minimum and the maximum values are about 5% lower in the newer data set than in the
older one, while the standard deviation is only 1.5% higher). The output series also seems to have suffered significant revision:
the minimum value is 24% lower and the standard deviation is 19% higher in the newer data set, while the mean is only 1.6%
higher. We did not use the 1960–1993 data set from O’Donnel et al. (1999) because it was revised and modified after 1993. Alternatively we could have used the data developed by ERS (1998) to obtain indexes of productivity by state for 1960–1996 or the revised version used in Ball et al. (2001). But the state-level expenditures on agricultural inputs used in the construction of their
quantity indexes needed for our estimation were not available to us.
13. We obtained the series of expenditures in purchased inputs, capital and labor in constant 1949 dollars by multiplying the
Fisher Ideal input quantity indexes (1949 = 100) by the expenditures in each input in 1949. Following standard indexing procedures when quantity indexes take the value of 100 in 1949 the expenditures in that year are used as proxies for prices. According to Acquaye et al. (2003), data for labor comprise 30 farm operator classes (five age and six education characteristics), family labor, and hired labor. Data for purchased inputs involve pesticides, fertilizers, fuel, seed, feed, repairs, machine hire, and
miscellaneous expenses. Capital involves buildings and structures, automobiles (units not for personal use), trucks, pickers and
balers, mowers and conditioners, tractors, combines, dairy cattle, breeder pigs, sheep and cows, and chickens (not broilers).
14. Land comprises cropland, irrigated cropland, and grassland, pasture, range and grazed forest. Agricultural output aggregates
field crops, fruits and nuts, vegetables and livestock.
15. Evenson (1989), Huffman and Evenson (1989, 1992, 1993, 2001), and Khanna et al. (1994) have constructed and used R&D
stocks for US states but these data sets have not been made public. We proceed to build our own for the purpose of this study.
The mean of G in our study closely resembles the mean of Huffman and Evenson’s “public agricultural research capital for an
originating state”: $1.73 million in 1949 dollars or $10.1 million in 1986 dollars. The mean of S in our study is lower than the
mean of Huffman and Evenson’s “public agricultural research capital spillin”: $7.65 million versus $8.86 million in 1949 dollars, or $44.7 million versus $51.8 million in 1986 dollars. We were unable to compare the distribution of our variables to theirs.
This is true for variables G and S in our study.
16. Different studies adopt different weight structures: inverted-V form (Evenson 1967), second order polynomial (Knutson and
Tweeten 1979) or trapezoidal (Huffman and Evenson 1989).
17. We realize that the marginal effects of public agricultural research expenditure on agricultural productivity might be endogenous
to each state and are likely to differ among states. But given that no publicly available study estimates the marginal effects for each
state, we use a set of estimated marginal effects at the national aggregate to compute the R&D stocks. While some early studies used
10- or 20-years lags (Evenson 1967; Knutson and Tweeten 1979; White and Havlicek 1979), more recent studies suggest that in order to properly capture the benefits of investment in research on agricultural production, lags of at least 30 years must be used in the
construction of the stocks (Pardey and Craig 1989; Schimmelpfennig and Thirtle 1994; Alston et al. 1998; Alston and Pardey 2001).
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public expenditures include all USDA appropriations,
CSREES administered funds, state appropriations, and
other federal and non-federal funds for State Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAES) and 1890 Institutions.18
Data on total public agricultural R&D expenditures at the
state level in current US dollars were obtained from the
Current Research Information System Database (CRIS)
for the period 1970–1991. Given the long lags assumed to
construct the stock, data is needed for earlier periods and
for the years 1919–1969, we have data only for agricultural R&D expenditures at SAES. These were collected, in
current dollars, from several USDA reports. These series
were used to construct a proxy for total agricultural R&D
expenditures at the state level for the years 1919–1969 using the average ratio of total to SAES agricultural R&D
expenditures in 1970–1980 and extrapolating to 1919.19
An agricultural R&D price index was constructed for the
period 1919–1999 from Huffman and Evenson (1993)and
USDA data, which was used to express the expenditure
series in constant 1949 dollars.20
The spill-in variable S is constructed as the sum of
the stocks of public agricultural R&D of the states that
share common borders or vertices with the state under analysis, indexed by j and i, respectively, in Equation (6). Similar geographical proximity criteria to construct spillover variables have previously been used by
Khanna et al. (1994), Huffman et al. (2002), and Yee et al.
(2002) to reflect similarities in climatic conditions, production conditions, input–output mixes, etc., among the
states under analysis. In the present study, S captures
the effects of structural spill-ins from R&D conducted in
neighboring states. For example, S for Nebraska consists
of the sum of the stocks of R&D in Wyoming, South Dakota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas and Colorado.21
4. Estimation and results
This section is organized as follows. Two versions of the
model consisting of the cost function and the capital and
purchased inputs shares, Equations (16) and (17), are
estimated maintaining symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices. Model 1 assumes that the spill-in variable S captures all relevant knowledge spillovers across
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states, i.e. it models structural spatial dependency. To
test for the existence of stochastic effects of knowledge
spillovers beyond the structural effects captured by S,
a modified version of the Keleijian and Robinson (1992)
test is performed on the residuals of Model 1. This test
provides an assessment of the extent of the propagation of spillovers not captured by the variable S, and of
the impact of any event that affects adjacent states and
is not captured in the structure of the model. It indicates the necessity to acknowledge and model stochastic
spatial dependency. Model 2 is estimated using threestage generalized spatial least squares (3SGSLS) to correct for the stochastic effects. Results from Model 2 are
then compared to those from Model 1 to assess the effect
of failing to account for stochastic dependency among
states. The best model is selected on the basis of the
McElroy System R2 and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for each equation.22
The variable cost and the purchased inputs and capital shares in Model 1 are estimated using iterative seemingly unrelated least squares (ITSUR in version SAS 9.1).
The share of labor has been dropped from the estimation to avoid singularity of the estimation matrix and its
parameters recovered using the set of restrictions imposed. One hundred and seventy-four parameters are
estimated with 6,192 observations (three stacked equations and 43 years for each of the 48 states.)
The model fits the data reasonably well, with a system R2 of 0.896 and adjusted R2 for each estimating
equation greater than 0.8. These parameters conform
to symmetry and homogeneity as these properties have
been imposed in estimation. The Hessian is negative
semi-definite at the mean of the data for each state implying concavity of the cost in prices at the mean of the
data. The cost function is non-decreasing in output as
the marginal cost evaluated at the mean of the data is
positive for all states. Parameter estimates are reported
in “Appendix 2”.
Given that our main objective is the estimation of returns to local public inputs and the calculation of the
implied IRR for public R&D investments we focus on
these estimates. The effects of public inputs on the demand for private variable inputs are computed from

18. USDA appropriations for the Forest Service, the McIntire-Stennis Act from the CSREES Administered Funds, and all funds for
Forestry Schools are excluded. USDA’s intramural research is not included in the current analysis, since it is not possible to assign benefits to particular states, and the focus of this study is to estimate the IRR to agricultural R&D conducted at the state
level. Extension is also excluded from the current analysis due to lack of data.
19. A similar methodology has been applied by Khanna et al. (1994) and Yee et al. (2002).
20. The concept of deflated total public agricultural R&D expenditures in this study resembles that of total public expenditures
on agricultural research used by Khanna et al. (1994). The main difference is that forestry funds are excluded from the present
study. We have not been able to do a numerical comparison as their data is not publicly available.
21. We also experimented with another pattern of technological similarity across states by applying cluster analysis techniques
to the states’ agricultural output-mix, and the results were highly dependent on the method used (single linkage, average linkage or centroid) and the criteria used to define the optimal number of clusters (hierarchical tree diagram, pseudo F statistic or
pseudo Hotteling’s T 2 test statistic).
22. The McElroy System R2 is a weighted average of the R2 for each equation in the system, and is bounded to the 0–1 interval
(Greene 2003, p. 345).
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Equations (19) and (20).23 The effects of G and S on purchased inputs and labor are statistically significant for
all states, but their effects on capital are not. An increase
in G or in S generates an increase in the demand for purchased inputs and a decrease in the demand for labor,
suggesting that technical change induced by public agricultural R&D has been biased towards the use of purchased inputs and against the use of labor in all states.24
The most important estimates for our purpose are the
estimates of the shadow prices for public inputs G and
S as they enter directly the calculation of the IRRs. The
shadow price of the own state stock of public agricultural R&D as defined in Equations (4) and (19) is evaluated at the sample mean of all variables and for each
state and it is reported in the second column of Table 1.
‾G measures the amount of cost savings in the producZ
tion of output at constant 1949 dollars stemming from
the public provision of an extra unit of G. Alternatively,
Z‾G measures producers’ willingness to pay for an extra
unit of stock of public local agricultural R&D. For example, the shadow value of G for Nebraska is, at the mean,
$414.69, indicating that a $1 increase in the stock of public agricultural R&D in Nebraska in a given year generated annual cost savings to agricultural producers of, on
average, $414.69. The estimates of Z‾G are statistically significant and positive for all states but California, Maine,
and Maryland. As shown below, the fact that Z‾G is not
statistically different from zero for California, Maine,
and Maryland is driven by the inability of Model 1 to
incorporate the effects of stochastic spatial dependency,
resulting in estimates with wide confidence intervals.25
Note, however, that in the present study a $1 increase
in the stock of public agricultural R&D in a given year
requires a $1 investment in public agricultural R&D activities during the previous 31 years. Therefore, the own
state annual average monetary benefit from investing an
extra dollar in public agricultural R&D in t0, is

(24)
where B refers to own state benefits as defined in Equation (21), and is a more intuitive measure of the benefits
from R&D investments in agriculture (second column
of Table 1). The 31-years annual average benefits vary
from $0.63 for New York to $23.28 for Missouri for every $1 invested (constant 1949 dollars), and the national
simple average amounts to $7.63 with a standard devi-

ation among states of $5.43. The national weighted average of the own state benefits, with the weights being
each state’s average share in total output, amounts to
$8.22 and is significant at the 1% level. It must be emphasized, however, that given the distribution assumed
in constructing the research stock variable, the impacts
are assumed to be higher in the distant future than in
the years immediately following the investment.
The average social shadow value of G,
(25)
where F is the social shadow value of research stocks defined in Equation (22), and the average social monetary
benefits from an extra dollar invested in agricultural
R&D in t0,
(26)
where B* refers to social benefits as defined in Equation
(22), are reported for each state in the last two columns
‾ are posiof Table 1. Except for Maine, all estimates of F
tive and significantly different from zero. As expected,
F‾ is greater than Z‾G, implying a positive shadow value
for research spillovers, ∑ ZSji. The implied annual avj≠i
erage social benefits from R&D, in 1949 dollars, range
from $3.79 (Rhode Island) to $90.09 (Missouri). The simple national average is $34.29 with a standard deviation
across states of $20.78. The national weighted average
of the social benefits, with the weights being each state’s
average shares in total output, amounts to $40.44 and is
significant at the 1% level.
The estimated average marginal IRR from own state
investment in public agricultural R&D, r̂, is obtained
by plugging the estimate of Z‾G from Table 1 into Equation (21) and solving for r. Similarly, the estimated average marginal IRR from social investments in public
agricultural R&D, r̂1, is obtained by plugging the estimate of F‾ from Table 1 into Equation (22) and solving for r1. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals for r̂
and r̂1 for each state are obtained by plugging the corresponding shadow values plus/minus two standard errors in Equations (21) and (22), respectively (Table 2 and
Figures 1 and 2). The simple average own state IRR for
the nation is 26.9%, with a standard deviation of 8.91%
across states. The weighted average own state IRR for
the nation is 27.4%, and the 95% confidence interval is
[26.2; 29.5%]. The highest own state IRR is 39% and cor-

23. Since private R&D expenditures are embodied in purchased inputs and capital, these effects should account, at least theoretically, for the interaction of public and private research. Our estimates also indicate that, at the mean of the data, land is a substitute for purchased inputs and capital, and a complement for labor in all states.
24. Price elasticities evaluated at the mean of the data for each state indicate that own-price elasticities are negative, as expected.
Cross-price elasticities for all inputs evaluated at the mean are positive, indicating that labor, purchased materials and capital
are substitutes in production. Marginal cost elasticities evaluated at the mean of the data show 26 states with increasing returns
to scale and 22 states with decreasing returns to scale.
25. The coefficients of variation are 107, 242 and 51% for California, Maine and Maryland respectively. Coefficient of variation
= standard error/|mean|.
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Table 1. Own state and social shadow values (Z, F) and benefits (B, B*) from agricultural R&D, no stochastic spatial dependency
(Model 1, constant 1949 dollars)
State

Z‾G

AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
Simple national average
Simple national SD
Weighted national average

226.42 (9.11)
608.53 (27.48)
126.93 (5.08)
−15.9 (16.95)
214.5 (9.86)
66.2 (4.77)
193.1 (15.39)
27.7 (6.81)
173.03 (10.51)
430.66 (28.19)
275.95 (12.16)
171.61 (13.23)
275.7 (13.57)
410.22 (23.86)
311.79 (14.78)
51.7 (5.42)
118.5 (7.4)
−5.14 (2.64)
−9.82 (23.74)
298.21 (12.5)
359.97 (23.12)
675.1 (32.11)
96.96 (7.5)
148.62 (9.38)
266.31 (16.07)
128.96 (8.36)
414.69 (22.71)
105.79 (16.04)
65.93 (4.68)
302.95 (14.2)
172.85 (12.68)
19.4 (6.97)
241.41 (11.88)
249.73 (9.25)
130.88 (12.61)
214.87 (11.47)
32.83 (4.48)
92.81 (7.99)
721.77 (36.73)
510.12 (21.14)
113.32 (20.09)
116.51 (12.18)
343.09 (13.28)
421.46 (24.33)
44.95 (11.28)
290.79 (13.65)
210.93 (11.10)
171.29 (12.15)
221.13
173.72
254.73 (16.85)

B‾
7.30 (0.082)
19.63 (0.249)
4.09 (0.046)
n/a
6.92 (0.089)
2.14 (0.043)
6.23 (0.139)
0.89 (0.062)
5.58 (0.095)
13.89 (0.255)
8.90 (0.110)
5.54 (0.120)
8.89 (0.123)
13.23 (0.216)
10.06 (0.134)
1.67 (0.049)
3.82 (0.067)
n/a
n/a
9.62 (0.113)
11.61 (0.209)
21.78 (0.291)
3.13 (0.068)
4.79 (0.085)
8.59 (0.145)
4.16 (0.076)
13.38 (0.205)
3.41 (0.145)
2.13 (0.042)
9.77 (0.128)
5.58 (0.115)
0.63 (0.063)
7.79 (0.107)
8.06 (0.084)
4.22 (0.114)
6.93 (0.104)
1.06 (0.041)
2.99 (0.072)
23.28 (0.332)
16.46 (0.191)
3.66 (0.182)
3.76 (0.110)
11.07 (0.120)
13.60 (0.220)
1.45 (0.102)
9.38 (0.123)
6.80 (0.100)
5.53 (0.110)
7.63
5.43
8.22 (0.15)

F‾
759.57 (18.76)
1,987.12 (49.99)
1,021.54 (33.09)
367.04 (19.40)
1,747.31 (58.14)
239.98 (11.49)
386.26 (19.19)
280.25 (13.14)
882.39 (28.29)
1,903.17 (64.29)
1,204.72 (34.82)
1,815.68 (59.57)
1,179.57 (30.00)
1,434.58 (44.22)
1,906.61 (53.69)
809.63 (24.97)
315.37 (19.41)
374.39 (25.13)
−29.03 (25.41)
1,552.31 (42.67)
1,525.61 (51.36)
2,792.67 (83.15)
793.26 (24.36)
891.18 (35.1)
834.11 (27.11)
811.07 (35.2)
2,112.61 (79.8)
255.01 (21.51)
296.8 (15.91)
1,447.21 (38.23)
1,076.17 (32.54)
369.16 (26.59)
1,196.53 (32.36)
1,846.47 (66)
859.55 (25.62)
642.32 (25.75)
117.54 (7.34)
385.78 (15.08)
2,275.57 (63.4)
1,936.01 (48.88)
764.04 (28.48)
1,021.92 (35.42)
938.1 (22.95)
564.29 (25.78)
408.34 (15.15)
1,301.38 (35.79)
829.04 (24.83)
1,501.56 (56.36)
1,040.25
656.54
1,253.72 (41.10)

B‾*
24.5 (0.170)
64.1 (0.452)
32.95 (0.299)
11.84 (0.176)
56.36 (0.526)
7.74 (0.104)
12.46 (0.174)
9.04 (0.119)
28.46 (0.256)
61.39 (0.582)
38.86 (0.315)
58.57 (0.539)
38.05 (0.271)
46.28 (0.400)
61.5 (0.486)
26.12 (0.226)
10.17 (0.176)
12.08 (0.227)
n/a
50.07 (0.386)
49.21 (0.465)
90.09 (0.752)
25.59 (0.220)
28.75 (0.318)
26.91 (0.245)
26.16 (0.318)
68.15 (0.722)
8.23 (0.195)
9.57 (0.144)
46.68 (0.346)
34.72 (0.294)
11.91 (0.241)
38.60 (0.293)
59.56 (0.597)
27.73 (0.232)
20.72 (0.233)
3.79 (0.066)
12.44 (0.136)
73.41 (0.574)
62.45 (0.442)
24.65 (0.258)
32.97 (0.320)
30.26 (0.208)
18.20 (0.233)
13.17 (0.137)
41.98 (0.324)
26.74 (0.225)
48.44 (0.510)
34.29
20.78
40.44 (0.37)

Approximated standard errors in parentheses; approximated standard errors obtained by the Delta method (Greene 2003).
n/a = not available
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Table 2. Own state (r) and social (r1) IRRs (in percentage), no stochastic spatial effects (Model 1), 95% confidence intervals in
square brackets
State

r̂

r̂1

State

r̂

r̂1

State

r̂

r̂1

AL

30.08 [29.5; 30.6]

39.41 [39.0; 39.8]

MD

n/a [n/a,n/a]

33.78 [32.7; 34.7]

OR

26.29 [24.9; 27.5]

40.45 [39.9; 40.9]

AR

37.58 [36.8; 38.3]

48.05 [47.6; 48.5]

ME

n/a [n/a; 18.5]

n/a [n/a; 15.3]

PA

29.7 [28.9; 30.4]

38.02 [37.3; 38.7]

AZ

26.08 [25.5; 26.6]

41.94 [41.4; 42.5]

MI

32.07 [31.4; 32.7]

45.71 [45.2; 46.2]

RI

17.65 [15.8; 19.1]

25.57 [24.7; 26.4]

CA

n/a [n/a; 14.2]

33.63 [32.8; 34.4]

MN

33.48 [32.4; 34.4]

45.54 [44.9; 46.2]

SC

24.03 [22.8; 25.1]

34 [33.4; 34.6]

CO

29.69 [29.0; 30.3]

46.82 [46.2; 47.4]

MO

38.43 [37.6; 39.2]

51.43 [50.8; 52.0]

SD

38.98 [38.1; 39.8]

49.37 [48.8; 49.9]

CT

21.88 [20.9; 22.7]

30.49 [29.8; 31.2]

MS

24.31 [23.2; 25.2]

39.77 [39.2; 40.3]

TN

36.17 [35.5; 36.8]

47.8 [47.3; 48.3]

DE

28.95 [27.7; 30.0]

34.01 [33.2; 34.7]

MT

27.14 [26.2; 28.0]

40.76 [40.1; 41.4]

TX

25.33 [22.5; 27.4]

39.46 [38.8; 40.1]

FL

16.67 [12.9; 19.0]

31.62 [30.9; 32.3]

NC

31.25 [30.3; 32.1]

40.2 [39.6; 40.7]

UT

25.51 [24.0; 26.8]

41.94 [41.3; 42.5]

GA

28.19 [27.3; 29.0]

40.67 [40.1; 41.2]

ND

26.19 [25.3; 27.0]

39.96 [39.2; 40.7]

VA

33.12 [32.5; 33.7]

41.2 [40.8; 41.6]

IA

34.85 [33.8; 35.8]

47.63 [47.0; 48.3]

NE

34.56 [33.7; 35.4]

48.64 [47.9; 49.4]

VT

34.68 [33.7; 35.5]

36.98 [36.2; 37.7]

ID

31.5 [30.8; 32.1]

43.39 [42.9; 43.9]

NH

24.88 [22.6; 26.6]

30.93 [29.6; 32.1]

WA

19.51 [15.5; 22.0]

34.44 [33.9; 35]

IL

28.13 [27.0; 29.1]

47.18 [46.5; 47.8]

NJ

21.86 [20.9; 22.7]

32.04 [31.2; 32.8]

WI

31.89 [31.2; 32.6]

44.09 [43.6; 44.6]

IN

31.5 [30.7; 32.2]

43.21 [42.7; 43.6]

NM

32.19 [31.5; 32.9]

45.06 [44.6; 45.5]

WV

29.57 [28.8; 30.3]

40.14 [39.6; 40.6]

KS

34.47 [33.5; 35.3]

44.98 [44.4; 45.5]

NV

28.18 [27.1; 29.1]

42.39 [41.8; 42.9]

WY

28.12 [27.1; 29.0]

45.4 [44.7; 46.1]

KY

32.4 [31.7; 33.1]

47.65 [47.1; 48.2]

NY

14.66 [8.0; 17.7]

33.67 [32.5; 34.7]

SNA*

28.65 [25.7; 28.5]

39.84 [39.2; 40.8]

LA

20.36 [18.9; 21.5]

39.94 [39.4; 40.5]

OH

30.54 [29.8; 31.2]

43.33 [42.8; 43.8]

WNA*

27.37 [26.2; 29.5]

42.33 [41.7; 43.0]

MA

25.62 [24.7; 26.4]

32.49 [31.5; 33.4]

OK

30.78 [30.2; 31.3]

47.34 [46.6; 48.0]

		

n/a IRR can not be calculated since the corresponding shadow value is negative, SNA simple national average, WNA weighted national average.
* The bounds of the confidence interval for the National Average are calculated as the average of the respective bounds for all states.

responds to South Dakota. The simple average social
IRR for the nation is 40%, with a standard deviation of
8.38%. The weighted average social IRR for the nation is
42.3%, and the 95% confidence interval is [41.7; 43.0%].
The highest social IRR is 51% and corresponds to Missouri. In all states but Maine the social IRR is significantly higher than the own state IRR, as indicated by the
non-overlapping confidence intervals reported beside
the IRR estimates in Table 2.
A modified version of the Keleijian and Robinson
(KR) test for spatial autocorrelation in systems of equations, from Cohen and Morrison Paul (2007) is used on
the errors of Model 1 to test for stochastic spatial dependence across states. The KR test provides an estimate of
the number of significant spatial lags in each equation.
It is a large sample test based on the generalized method
of moments (GMM) and it does not require the model
to be linear, the disturbance terms to be normal, or the
pattern of spatial correlation to be specified. The KR test

requires an a priori choice of the neighboring states that
might be spatially correlated, but it does not require
knowledge of the spatial weights. A geographical pattern of proximity among states is proposed as the driving force for spatial autocorrelation in the error structure. For each state, the US map is divided in concentric
“rings” with the state under analysis as its center, the
states that share a common border or intercept with the
center as the first “ring” of neighboring states; the states
that are detached from the center but share common
borders or intercepts with the first “ring” as the second
“ring” of neighboring states; and so on and so forth.26
In this geographical partitioning of the space, states are
expected to be more closely related to immediate neighboring states than those farther away. The results from
the KR test suggest that there exists stochastic spatial dependency among states that are as much as four states
apart from one another. This would be consistent with
knowledge spillovers flowing widely across states and

26. For example, Wyoming, South Dakota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas and Colorado belong to the first “ring” of neighboring states
for Nebraska; while New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Kentucky,
Tennessee, Arkansas and Oklahoma form its second “ring” of neighboring states; Texas, California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia form its
third “ring” of neighboring states.
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Figure 1. Histogram of the own state IRR’s, (r̂)—Model 1

Figure 2. Histogram of the social IRR’s, (r̂1)—Model 1

generating the spatial lag structures.27 The variable cost
function, ln c, and the capital share, SHk , support a spatial lag length of 5, while the share of purchased inputs,
SHM , has a spatial lag of length 4.
To incorporate the effects of stochastic spatial dependency in the estimation of the benefits from public agricultural R&D, Model 2 is estimated using the GS3SLS
procedure proposed by Keleijian and Prucha (2004). The
first stage corresponds to the estimation of Model 1. In
the second stage, the residuals from Model 1 and the
lag structure suggested by the KR test are used to estimate the spatial autocorrelation parameters for each estimating equation using GMM. The estimates of the spatial autocorrelation parameters (Table 3), which are all
bounded to the unit circle, are used to perform a Cochrane-Orcutt-type transformation on the observed
variables, in a similar fashion to the standard procedure to correct for serial autocorrelation in time series.
In the third stage, Model 2 determined by Equations
(16) and (17) is re-estimated on the transformed variables with symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices
maintained.28
The share of labor has been dropped from the estimation to avoid singularity as in estimation of Model
1. One hundred and seventy-four parameters are estimated with 6,192 observations (three stacked equations
and 43 years for each of the 48 states) in Model 2. The
system R2 for Model 2 (R2 = 0.911) is higher than the

one from Model 1, and the AICs are lower for each estimating equation. Model 2 provides a better fit to the
transformed data than Model 1 does to the untransformed data. The estimated parameters conform to symmetry and homogeneity as these properties have been
imposed in the estimation. The Hessian is negative
semi-definite at the mean of the data for each state implying concavity of the cost in prices at the mean of the
data. The cost function is non-decreasing in output as
the marginal cost evaluated at the mean of the data is
positive for all states.29 The estimates from Model 2 and
the associated goodness of fit measures are reported in
“Appendix 3”.
The effects of G and S on the demand for variable inputs (measured as the elasticities of demand with respect to the fixed public inputs) are all significant in
Model 2. An increase in G or S generates an increase in
the demand for purchased inputs and capital, and a decrease in the demand for labor, suggesting that technical change induced by public agricultural R&D has been
biased towards the use of purchased inputs and capital
and against labor.30, 31
The own state shadow value of G, Z‾G, and the own
state monetary benefits from an extra dollar invested in
R&D in t0, B‾, are evaluated at the mean and reported for
each state in the first two columns of Table 4. The estimates of Z
‾G are statistically significant and positive for
all states.32 B‾ ranges from $0.05 in Oregon to $2.63 in

27. We cannot discard the possibility of other variables not included in the model structure, like weather for example, adding to
this dependency. In any case IRRs should be corrected if spatial dependency is present no matter what the source.
28. Plastina and Fulginiti (2007) provide a more detailed description of the GMM estimator of the spatial lags, along with descriptive statistics, elasticity estimates and concavity results by states not included here due to space limitations.
29. The marginal cost elasticities evaluated at the mean of the variables indicate increasing returns to scale for all states, satisfying
one of the necessary conditions for endogenous growth (Onofri and Fulginiti). A second condition, namely that of non-negative
returns to public inputs, is also satisfied as the estimates of the shadows for public R&D in Table 4 show.
30. Land is a substitute for purchased inputs and capital, and a complement of labor.
31. For all states, the own-price elasticities are negative, as expected, and the cross-price elasticities for all inputs are positive, indicating that labor, purchased materials and capital are substitutes.
32. The coefficients of variation for California, and Maine are now significantly lower than in Model 1 (55, and 18%, respectively),
while the coefficient of variation for Maryland is higher (77%).
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Table 3. Estimates of the spatial autocorrelation parameters
Equation

ρ1

ρ2

ρ3

ρ4

ρ5

ln c
SH K
SH M

0.265554
0.634002
0.587572

0.493288
−0.14269
−0.05815

0.196007
0.22608
0.353718

−0.37656
0.180117
0.063719
0.010952
−0.19113	 

Standard errors for estimates in Table 3 are not reported because the significance of the spatial effects has been determined
through the KR test, as a previous step to the estimation of the ρ’s using GMM.

Maine and the simple national average is $0.94, while
the weighted national average is $1.02 and is statistically significant at the 1% level (constant 1949 dollars).
The estimates of own state benefits are now significantly
lower than the own state benefits obtained in Model 1.
The social shadow value of public agricultural R&D,
‾, and the social monetary benefits from an extra dolF
lar invested in R&D in t0, B
‾*, are evaluated at the mean
and reported for each state in the last two columns of
Table 4. All social shadows are non-negative and significantly different from zero. Social shadows are higher
than own state shadow values for public agricultural
‾ are greater than Z‾G), implyR&D stocks (estimates of F
ing a positive shadow value for spillouts, ∑ ZSji . Social
j≠i
benefits, B
‾*, range from $0.33 in Rhode Island to $18.46
in Missouri, with a simple national average of $6.39
(constant 1949 dollars) and a weighted national average
of $7.98, significant at the 1% level. As mentioned before, benefits from the investment have a higher impact
in the distant future than in the years immediately following the investment in R&D.
The estimated own state (r̂) and social (r̂ 1) IRRs consistent with Model 2 for each state are reported in Table 5 and Figures 3–6, along with their 95% confidence
intervals. The highest average own state IRR corresponds to Maine and equals 23.18%, while the lowest
corresponds to Oregon and equals 2%. The simple average own state IRR for the nation is 16% with a standard
deviation across states of 4.51%. The weighted average
own state IRR for the nation is 16.5%, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 8.6 to 19.8%. In all states
but California, Maryland and Maine (states where the
own state IRR could not be estimated in Model 1), the
own state IRR from Model 2 is significantly lower than
that from Model 1.33
These estimates are consistent with the estimates of
returns to investments in public agricultural R&D and
extension by Lu et al. (1979) (25%), White and Havlicek
(7–36%), Evenson (11–45%), Oehmke (1996) (11.6%),
and Alston, Craig and Pardey (7–31%). However, they
are significantly lower than the rates estimated in most

other studies. Evenson (2001) reports IRRs to aggregate
public sector agricultural research (not including extension) from several studies ranging from 25 to 212%.
The social IRRs from Model 2 range from 11.26% in
Rhode Island to 37.09% in Missouri. The simple national
average is 27% and its standard deviation across states is
6.56%. The weighted national average is 29.3%, and the
95% confidence interval is [26.5; 31.1%]. The social IRRs
are lower in Model 2 than in Model 1 for all states except
for Maine (state for which the social IRR could not be calculated in Model 1). These are significant differences as
indicated by the non-overlapping confidence intervals.
The social IRRs obtained from Model 1 are, on average,
14% higher than the ones estimated with Model 2.
Our estimates of the social IRRs, once correction has
been made for stochastic spatial dependency, even
though impressive relative to market returns of private
investments, are significantly lower than those calculated by Evenson (1989), Huffman and Evenson (1993,
2006), and Yee et al. (2002). These authors estimate rates
between 49 and 600%.
Huffman et al. (2002) obtain estimates for the Midwestern states. For comparison purposes we calculate a
simple average and a weighted average of our estimates
for the states of Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, and
Indiana. The simple and weighted average own state
IRRs for the Midwestern states, 18 and 17.32%34 respectively, are higher than the 11% in their study. Our simple
and weighted social IRR for the Midwestern states are approximately 33%35—figures that are lower than the “significantly higher than 40%” reported in their paper.36
Although the analysis of the patterns of these rates
across states is not the objective of this paper, we note
here some interesting relationships. The ten states with
lower spillover effects are concentrated in the Northeast
of the country, and include Rhode Island, Maine, Connecticut, Delaware Vermont, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and New York. These
states’ average own IRRs is 16%, equal to the average for
all states but their spillovers are very low, with an average rate of 0.8%. This result is consistent with the percep-

33. Mean difference of 12.8% and a standard deviation of 4.6%.
34. The 95% confidence interval is [5.98; 21.14%].
35. The 95% confidence interval is [31.21; 34.91%].
36. Our estimate of the average elasticity of variable cost with respect to the stock of public R&D in these states is −5%, lower than
the −87% estimated in their study.
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Table 4. Own state and social shadow values (Z‾G, F‾ ) and benefits (B‾,B‾*) from agricultural R&D, with stochastic spatial effects
(Model 2, constant 1949 dollars)
State

Z‾G

B‾

AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY

34.9 (5.78)
51.0 (17.07)
11.6 (3.16)
17.1 (9.41)
21.1 (6.40)
14.4 (2.63)
33.2 (8.90)
22.0 (3.64)
31.5 (6.39)
37.1 (18.19)
31.7 (7.51)
12.3 (8.61)
29.4 (9.13)
62.3 (14.88)
14.3 (9.72)
5.5 (3.25)
22.4 (4.13)
1.9 (1.42)
81.4 (14.80)
30.0 (8.27)
52.2 (14.40)
51.7 (20.58)
17.6 (4.60)
30.0 (5.88)
55.5 (9.75)
30.3 (5.19)
52.4 (14.32)
49.9 (9.32)
13.0 (2.63)
23.8 (8.07)
6.3 (6.96)
8.6 (3.78)
31.7 (7.86)
30.1 (6.23)
1.6 (7.67)
20.3 (7.56)
12.7 (2.56)
35.9 (4.51)
70.8 (21.84)
34.8 (13.23)
24.2 (11.91)
10.4 (7.20)
34.2 (8.31)
65.1 (13.25)
20.2 (6.84)
28.7 (9.29)
13.5 (6.21)
13.6 (7.01)

1.13 (0.052)
1.65 (0.154)
0.38 (0.029)
0.55 (0.085)
0.68 (0.058)
0.47 (0.024)
1.07 (0.081)
0.71 (0.033)
1.02 (0.058)
1.2 (0.165)
1.02 (0.068)
0.4 (0.078)
0.95 (0.083)
2.01 (0.135)
0.46 (0.088)
0.18 (0.029)
0.72 (0.037)
0.06 (0.013)
2.63 (0.134)
0.97 (0.075)
1.68 (0.13)
1.67 (0.186)
0.57 (0.042)
0.97 (0.053)
1.79 (0.088)
0.98 (0.047)
1.69 (0.13)
1.61 (0.084)
0.42 (0.024)
0.77 (0.073)
0.2 (0.063)
0.28 (0.034)
1.02 (0.071)
0.97 (0.056)
0.05 (0.069)
0.65 (0.068)
0.41 (0.023)
1.16 (0.041)
2.28 (0.198)
1.12 (0.12)
0.78 (0.108)
0.33 (0.065)
1.1 (0.075)
2.1 (0.12)
0.65 (0.062)
0.93 (0.084)
0.44 (0.056)
0.44 (0.063)

F‾
123.7 (15.79)
317.0 (40.70)
198.4 (24.39)
94.4 (12.34)
385.9 (43.37)
12.9 (8.41)
29.9 (12.86)
64.8 (8.56)
159.1 (21.18)
390.4 (46.32)
226.3 (26.90)
358.3 (44.04)
183.1 (24.95)
313.0 (33.41)
350.9 (42.92)
157.3 (19.09)
21.6 (13.30)
55.0 (15.76)
72.0 (15.52)
243.9 (34.21)
313.7 (36.78)
572.3 (63.53)
174.3 (18.59)
231.6 (25.33)
175.1 (19.58)
214.2 (24.12)
525.6 (56.47)
80.6 (13.73)
16.8 (11.33)
240.0 (30.81)
172.7 (24.64)
20.7 (17.32)
185.9 (26.30)
444.6 (47.68)
143.4 (20.04)
34.1 (19.68)
10.4 (4.96)
96.0 (10.45)
420.0 (49.68)
342.2 (40.86)
168.5 (20.00)
228.5 (26.57)
122.6 (19.00)
58.9 (16.08)
98.6 (11.24)
212.3 (28.65)
80.3 (19.50)
359.4 (41.15)

B‾*
3.99 (0.143)
10.23 (0.368)
6.4 (0.221)
3.04 (0.112)
12.45 (0.392)
0.42 (0.076)
0.97 (0.116)
2.09 (0.077)
5.13 (0.192)
12.59 (0.419)
7.3 (0.243)
11.56 (0.398)
5.91 (0.226)
10.1 (0.302)
11.32 (0.388)
5.07 (0.173)
0.7 (0.12)
1.78 (0.143)
2.32 (0.14)
7.87 (0.31)
10.12 (0.333)
18.46 (0.575)
5.62 (0.168)
7.47 (0.229)
5.65 (0.177)
6.91 (0.218)
16.96 (0.511)
2.6 (0.124)
0.54 (0.103)
7.74 (0.279)
5.57 (0.223)
0.67 (0.157)
6.0 (0.238)
14.34 (0.431)
4.63 (0.181)
1.1 (0.178)
0.33 (0.045)
3.1 (0.095)
13.55 (0.449)
11.04 (0.37)
5.44 (0.181)
7.37 (0.24)
3.96 (0.172)
1.9 (0.145)
3.18 (0.102)
6.85 (0.259)
2.59 (0.176)
11.59 (0.372)
(continued)
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Table 4. Continued.
State

Z‾G

B‾

F‾

Simple national average
Simple national SD
Weighted national average

29.25
18.64
31.55 (10.48)

0.94
0.60
1.02 (0.095)

B‾*

197.95
141.88
247.4 (30.52)

6.39
4.58
7.98 (0.276)

Approximated standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5. Own state (r̂ ) and social (r̂ 1) IRRs, with stochastic spatial effects (Model 2) 95% confidence intervals in brackets.
State r̂

r̂ 1

State

r̂

r̂ 1

AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA

25.91 [24.0; 27.4]
32.53 [30.4; 34.3]
29.14 [27.2; 30.7]
24.13 [22.2; 25.7]
34.01 [32.1; 35.6]
12.42 [n/a; 17.1]
17.12 [6.7; 20.8]
21.75 [19.9; 23.2]
27.61 [25.5; 29.2]
34.1 [32.1; 35.7]
30.07 [28.2; 31.6]
33.44 [31.4; 35.1]
28.58 [26.4; 30.3]
32.43 [30.7; 33.9]
33.29 [31.2; 35.0]
27.53 [25.7; 29.0]
15.26 [n/a; 19.9]

MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK

2.78 [n/a; 7.2]
23.18 [20.4; 25.2]
17.12 [12.6; 19.7]
20.42 [15.7; 23.2]
20.36 [11.4; 24.0]
14.12 [10.2; 16.5]
17.12 [14.3; 19.1]
20.79 [18.2; 22.7]
17.19 [14.8; 18.9]
20.44 [15.8; 23.2]
20.15 [17.4; 22.1]
12.46 [9.7; 14.3]
15.81 [9.7; 18.8]
8.68 [n/a; 14.9]
10.31 [0.3; 13.7]
17.45 [13.6; 19.8]
17.15 [14.1; 19.2]

20.74 [15.7; 23.6]
OR
1.99 [n/a; 13.9]
22.4 [18.9; 24.7]
PA
14.9 [7.7; 18.1]
30.61 [28.3; 32.4]
RI
12.33 [9.6; 14.2]
32.45 [30.5; 34.0]
SC
18.18 [16.5; 19.5]
37.09 [35.1; 38.7]
SD
22.3 [16.6; 25.4]
28.24 [26.6; 29.6]
TN
17.99 [10.1; 21.4]
30.24 [28.5; 31.7]
TX
15.89 [n/a; 19.9]
28.27 [26.5; 29.7]
UT
11.27 [n/a; 16.0]
29.68 [27.9; 31.1]
VA
17.89 [14.1; 20.3]
36.41 [34.5; 38.0]
VT
21.77 [18.6; 23.9]
23.12 [20.5; 25.0]
WA
14.89 [8.9; 17.8]
13.86 [n/a; 18.7]
WI
16.87 [11.1; 19.8]
30.49 [28.4; 32.2]
WV
12.69 [0.5; 16.3]
28.17 [25.9; 29.9]
WY
12.71 [n/a; 16.7]
15.02 [n/a; 20.8]
SNA*
15.69 [9.7; 18.8]
28.68 [26.4; 30.4]
WNA* 16.54 [8.6; 19.8]
35.1 [33.3; 36.6]			

18.01 [15.7; 19.7]
20.28 [13.9; 23.5]
11.88 [7.8; 14.2]
13.97 [n/a; 18.2]
15.13 [10.1; 17.8]
13.04 [10.6; 14.7]
17.73 [13.4; 20.3]
15.36 [13.1; 17.0]
17.41 [14.5; 19.4]
18.38 [n/a; 22.5]
17.45 [13.8; 19.7]
12.19 [n/a; 17.0]
17.02 [11.7; 19.9]
21.5 [17.6; 24.0]
13 [n/a; 17.8]
7.97 [n/a; 12.0]
15.46 [12.9; 17.3]

State

r̂

r̂ 1
26.9 [24.7; 28.6]
17.88 [n/a; 22.5]
11.26 [n/a; 14.9]
24.24 [22.7; 25.5]
34.66 [32.6; 36.3]
33.1 [31.1; 34.7]
28.01 [26.2; 29.5]
30.14 [28.3; 31.7]
25.85 [23.4; 27.7]
21.16 [16.5; 23.9]
24.42 [22.8; 25.8]
29.62 [27.4; 31.3]
23.1 [19.0; 25.7]
33.47 [31.5; 35.0]
26.95 [23.1; 29.1]
29.31 [26.5; 29.3]

n/a: IRR can not be calculated since the corresponding shadow value is negative, SNA simple national average, WNA weighted national average.
* The bounds of the confidence intervals for the National Averages are calculated as the average of the respective bounds for all states.

Figure 3. Histogram of the own state IRRs (r̂ )—Model 2.

Figure 4. Histogram of the social IRRs (r̂ 1)—Model 2.

tion that these states produce specialty crops that are not
produced in other areas of the country leading to minimal spillovers. The set of states at the opposite side of
this spectrum, those with high spillovers are not, except
for Illinois, ones thought of as major agricultural producers. This set includes Maryland, Utah, Oklahoma, Colorado, Nevada, Louisiana, Kentucky, Wyoming, Illinois,
and Oregon. Presumably these states’ public agricultural research is not appropriated fully by each of them
but they have important positive effects on other states.
These states have below average own IRRs of 10% but

important spillover effects of 20%. The states with major
agricultural sectors lie in the middle of this distribution.
These state’s own IRRs and spillover rates are higher than
the average, 19 and 13% respectively. They have been
able to appropriate their investments as reflected by the
decrease in their costs of production plus they have facilitated important productivity improvements in other
states, presumably those with similar production characteristics. The explanation of these patterns, though not
the objective of this paper, is deserving of additional research and a natural next step to the analysis here.
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Figure 5. Own state IRRs to public agricultural R&D—Model
2. References: White r = 0–10%; Gray r = 10–20%; Black
r > 20%.

Figure 6. Social IRRs to public agricultural R&D expenditures—Model 2. References: White r = 10–20%; Gray r = 20–
30%; Black r > 30%.

5. Conclusions

ysis should be mentioned. First, we know of updated
data sets for US agriculture being developed by USDA
and by Alston, Pardey, and colleagues. Presumably
these would be better to use in the analysis, but the data
needed for this analysis is not yet available for public
use. Second, given the growing importance of private
investments in agricultural R&D, we might err by attributing benefits to public investments that might have
been the result of private investments. We hope that the
quality adjustments included by Craig, Pardey, and Acquaye in the painstaking job of constructing the output
and input indexes are enough to diminish the impact of
this potential flaw. We would expect that the appropriable benefits of private research are embodied in the input aggregates used and therefore effectively captured
in this study. Similarly, the omission of the extension
services, the stock of infrastructure, and of international
spillovers as well as USDA’s intramural research might
also render our estimates upward biased. Third, our
analysis is static, and assumes naïve expectation formation in production and decision making, all these compromising our estimates.
All in all, even if we provide estimates of the rate
of return to public R&D in agriculture lower than previously suggested, an average return of 29% on public
funds is still impressive compared to the 9 and 12% average returns of the S&P500 and NASDAQ composite
indexes during the same period.

The present study is an attempt at providing a quantitative assessment of the returns to public agricultural
R&D investments in the United States. This is done
first by deriving the returns to a local public good from
a theoretical model of firm behavior using the concept
of virtual prices, then showing how to measure them
when no information is available on market rates of return. Our method explicitly acknowledges for the spillover effects of these investments by incorporating them
structurally and stochastically in the model and by allowing endogenous derivation of virtual prices, own
and social. The objective is to use these estimates in calculating marginal internal rates of return to the use of
public monies on R&D investments in agriculture. The
study uses a data set of inputs and outputs developed
by Craig, Pardey, and Acquaye for specific use in productivity analysis combined with R&D stocks built following Evenson’s inverted-V lag structure in a model allowing for spatial stochastic corrections.
The own state internal rate of return we estimate is, on
average for the nation, 17%. The social internal rate of return we estimate is, on average, 29%.
Knowledge spillovers are important in agriculture
and an attempt at capturing all information structurally
and stochastically should be considered. After adjusting
for stochastic spatial effects, the estimated returns to agricultural investments in R&D in the United States are
fairly high, but lower than estimates for the Midwest by
Huffman et al. (2002).
Although not a primary focus of this analysis, our
study has also found that in aggregate US agriculture,
technical change induced by public agricultural R&D
has been biased towards the use of capital and purchased inputs and against the use of labor. We also
found evidence of potential long term impacts of public
R&D investments on long run growth of the sector.
A number of important shortcomings of this anal-
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Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of the variables pooled through time and states.
Variable

Units

N

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Output quantity

(1949 = 100)

2,064

145.51

55.88

62.65

418.68

Land quantity

(1949 = 100)

2,064

84.56

20.34

23.63

122.88

Labor quantity

(1949 = 100)

2,064

59.49

21.22

16.68

100.99

Capital quantity

(1949 = 100)

2,064

121.47

33.32

40.72

302.30

Purchased inputs quantity

(1949 = 100)

2,064

179.36

85.60

39.08

562.24

Expenditures on land in 1949

$1,000

48

132,515

116,648

2,119

529,117

Expenditures on labor in 1949

$1,000

48

303,343

217,003

11,909

931,771

Expenditures on capital in 1949

$1,000

48

177,403

143,910

8,546

526,525

Expenditures on purchased inputs in 1949 $1,000

48

140,533

115,487

8,641

534,242

Total Value of agricultural output in 1949

48

620,240

566,447

21,858

2,399,574

$1,000

Source: Acquaye et al. (2003)

Table 7. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis pooled through time and states.
Variable

Units

N

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

wM

(1949 = 100)

2,064

201

117

94

593

wL

(1949 = 100)

2,064

446

328

95

1,415

wK

(1949 = 100)

2,064

207

115

84

483

SHM

Proportion of the variable cost

2,064

0.3882

0.1182

0.1455

0.8195

SHL

Proportion of the variable cost

2,064

0.2810

0.0986

0.0623

0.6594

SHK

Proportion of the variable cost

2,064

0.3307

0.0651

0.1182

0.5300

T

$1,000 (constant 1949 dollars)

2,064

122,989

118,897

587

532,774

y

$1,000 (constant 1949 dollars)

2,064

920,314

905,341

14,694

5,631,427

G

$1,000 (constant 1949 dollars)

2,064

1,729

1,943

99

16,624

S

$1,000 (constant 1949 dollars)

2,064

7,649

5,979

138

31,426

c

$1,000 (constant 1949 dollars)

2,064

664,066

545,272

10,702

3,183,774

Sources G and S are based on author’s calculations. All other variables are from Acquaye et al. (2003).

Appendix 2: Model 1, no SAR error structure
Method of estimation: ITSUR.
Parameters in the model: 174.
Linear Restrictions: 55.
Parameters Estimated: 119.
Method: Gauss.
Number of Iterations: 50.
Final Convergence Criteria: CONVERGE = 0.001
Criteria Met.
Observations Processed: 2064.

Equation

DF model

DF error

R2

ln c

83.11

1,981

0.8084 0.8004

0.24942

SHM

17.94

2,046

0.9376 0.9371

0.001031

SHK

17.94

2,046

0.8034 0.8017

0.000985

System R2: 0.896487

Adj. R2 AIC
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Parameter estimates
Parameter
δT

Estimate

SE

T-value

Parameter

Estimate

SE

T-value

β KY

1.661054

0.1796

9.25

δY

−1.03266

0.2336

−4.42

β MK

δG

0.439636

0.2601

1.69

0.067766

0.00568

11.93

β MT

−0.01813

0.00601

−3.02

0.124598

0.00561

22.21

β MY
β LK
β LT

β LY

0.037924

0.00415

9.14

0.068861

0.00575

11.98

−0.08621

0.0052

−16.56

β LL

−0.11914

0.00352

−33.87

−0.14898

0.00501

−29.71

β KK

−0.10569

0.00835

−12.66

−0.19386

0.0293

−6.62

β YY

−0.07296

0.0644

−1.13

−0.05074

0.00559

−9.07

β MM
β TT

β KT

−0.03839

0.00509

−7.54

β TY

0.144139

0.0386

3.73

β MG

0.009626

0.00415

2.32

β LG

−0.01025

0.00386

−2.65

β KG

0.000619

0.00377

0.16

β TG

0.014571

0.0281

0.52

β YG

−0.09133

0.0463

−1.97

β GS

−0.24097

0.021

−11.46

β ML

0.081212

0.00325

24.98

β MS

0.034992

0.00415

8.43

β LS

−0.03773

0.00387

−9.75

β KS

0.002742

0.00388

0.71

β TS

−0.16861

0.0162

−10.39

β GG

0.31271

0.0374

8.35

β YS

0.239682

0.0181

13.25

Parameters estimates of dummy variables are not reported but can be obtained from the authors.

Appendix 3: Model 2, with SAR error structure
Method: Gauss.
Number of Iterations: 41.
Final Convergence Criteria: CONVERGE = 0.001
Criteria Met.
Observations Processed: 2064.

Method of estimation: ITSUR.
Parameters in the model: 174.
Linear Restrictions: 55.
Parameters Estimated: 119.

Equation

DF model

DF error

R2

Adj. R2

AIC

ln c*

83.11

1,981

0.9324

0.9296

0.06615

SHM *

17.94

2,046

0.926

0.9254

0.000611

17.94

2,046

0.8904

0.8895

0.000418

SHK *

System R2: 0.911236
* Transformed variables
Parameter
δT

δY

δG

Estimate

SE

T-value

Parameter

Estimate

SE

T-value

β KY

1.007875

0.1101

9.15

−0.35228

0.1432

−2.46

−0.40512

0.1617

−2.51

β MK

0.074332

0.00888

8.37

−0.03649

0.00736

−4.96

β MY

0.135337

0.00451

30.02

0.070494

0.00739

9.54

0.076869

0.00634

12.12

−0.08035

0.00378

−21.25

−0.12925

0.0072

−17.95

β MT
β LK
β LT

β LY
β LL

−0.05499

0.00384

−14.33

β TY

−0.07576

0.0204

−3.71

β MG

0.013477

0.00299

4.51

β LG

−0.01807

0.0026

−6.95

β KG

0.004589

0.0026

1.77

β TG

0.035987

0.0166

2.17

β YG

−0.04832

0.0268

−1.80

β GS

0.035599

0.0132

2.69

β ML

0.058759

0.0058

10.14

β MS

0.040074

0.00347

11.54
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Parameter

Estimate

SE

T-value

β MM

−0.13309

0.00907

−14.68

β KK

−0.14483

0.0119

−12.20

0.03303

0.0156

2.12

β YY

0.161682

0.0351

4.61

−0.04038

0.00602

−6.70

β TT

β KT

Parameter

Estimate

SE

T-value

β LS

β TS

β YS

−0.03284

0.00329

−9.99

β KS

−0.00724

0.00342

−2.12

−0.05169

0.0096

−5.39

β GG

0.039228

0.0207

1.89

0.020784

0.0104

2.00

The parameters corresponding to dummy variables are not reported but can be obtained from the authors.
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